We conduct two policy experiments in a general equilibrium framework with an informal sector. The first deals with a liberal trade policy and the second with a decline in the unionized wage rate. In both cases, informal workers gain if capital moves between the formal and the informal segments and lose if it does not. These results are independent of the factor intensity rankings of the sectors. Both of these results have important policy implications.
Introduction
Does liberal trade policy hurt workers? Does militant labour unionism help nonunionized workers? Throughout the entire developing world, such questions are raised in the public domain and are usually responded with heated debates. However, emotions can run high and political instincts may overpower scientific arguments. Naturally, this calls for exploring simple economics, which can shed some light on such profound issues. Our purpose here is to provide a framework for addressing these intriguing questions.
It is well known that a large part of the workforce in the developing world is absorbed in the informal sector. 1 While organized workforce can negotiate and use bargaining strength to affect the unionized wage, informal labour market usually responds to competitive conditions. Detailed discussion on the structure of such markets, their relevance in the developing world and a survey on other related issues is available in Agenor (1996) . Fields (1990) , Rauch (1991) and Agenor and Montiel (1996) are some of the theoretical works that explore the structure and composition of informal labour markets. Many recent empirical papers show increasing employment in the informal sector due to structural adjustments in the economy. Gafar (1997) shows that unemployment rate fell in post-reform Jamaica due to rapid decline in growth of labour force and subsequent expansion in job creation mainly in the low productivity informal sector. Alleyne (2001) later confirms that there has been considerable informalization of the economy, as the pool of self-employed individuals, contract workers, contractors, and lower-level workers have grown substantially. Amadeo & Pero (2000) , however, show that there has been a shift of workers in Brazil from the informal manufacturing to the informal service sector and has caused an increase in both the share of self-employed workers and informal wage. Unni and Rani (1999) also indicate an increase in agricultural and informal employment in India in the postreform period. More recently, Zagha (1998) and Dev (2000) also show that post-reform India has a larger share of informal workers. However, expansion of employment does not necessarily reflect growing impoverishment in the informal sector, since real wages can experience favourable movements even with higher employment, as in the post-reform period. Such issues are usually unexplored. Some statistical evidence supporting the claim of rising real wage in the informal sector is available from various issues of the National Sample Survey of India (1984-85 to 1999-2000) .
Here we follow up with a simple two sector model developed along the lines of Carruth and Oswald (1981) , Agenor and Montiel (1996) , Kar and Marjit (2001) , and Marjit and Beladi (2002) to demonstrate the interesting role played by mobility of capital in dictating the policy outcomes for the informal sector. If capital is mobile between the formal and informal segments, liberal trade policy must improve the informal wage. 2 By the same argument a more aggressive wage bargaining in the formal sector must hurt an average informal worker. Both these results are reversed if capital is sector-specific in the sense of Jones (1971) . An interesting aspect of these results with capital mobility is that they do not require any assumption on factor intensity rankings.
Section 2 develops the model and discusses the results. Last section concludes.
Models and Results

Perfect Capital Mobility
Two sectors in the economy, formal and informal, produce X and Y respectively. In the formal sector, wage is determined by unionized bargaining and it is higher than the marketclearing wage prevailing in the informal sector. Workers initially try to find a job in the formal sector. In case they do not, they choose to join the informal sector. As already hinted, wage rate adjusts in the informal sector to absorb all workers who are not employed in the formal sector. There is no unemployment in the model, which is characterized by wage differential and also by full-employment. Our small economy assumption means that prices of X and Y are given in the rest of the world. X represents the sector, which enjoys either protection or a subsidy, which in turn pops up its effective price relative to Y. One can interpret X as an import-competing good, which enjoys a tariff t, and Y as an exportable.
Technology is CRS with diminishing marginal products and the market for the commodities is competitive. We first consider the case with capital mobility and then discuss the case with sector-specific capital. The following symbols will be used in our framework: 
Given, w , and , one can determine r and w from (1) and (2), while (3) and (4) determines X and Y.
A
decline (rise) in t ( w ) must increase (reduce) w.
Proof: A decline in t, given w will reduce r and from (2) w must go up. A rise in w must reduce r as well, and raise w. QED.
A decline in t and/or a rise in w drives away both labour and capital into Y. But as r drops, marginal product of labour must go up raising w. This suggests that capital-labour ratio in Y must increase following such changes, i.e., capital is displaced at a greater rate relative to labour. We do not need factor intensity rankings for such a result. Sector-Specific Capital Next, we introduce the specific-factor case. The specific factor model alters the previous specifications. Two added symbols will be used here.
Capital specific to sector X; return r X K Y : Capital specific to sector Y; return r Y General equilibrium structure of the system is given by:
Now and have to be fully utilized as specific factors, as they cannot be relocated in other sectors. Equations (5) - (9) determine , given
, . This specification generates the following proposition.
Proposition II:
decline (rise) in t ( w ) must reduce (increase) w.
Proof: First note that factor prices need to be solved simultaneously with the outputs, unlike in the earlier system where commodity prices and w could uniquely solve for the factor prices. A drop in t then reduces r X from (5). From (8) Suppose one includes another non-traded good produced in the informal sector along with the existing traded good. The price of the non-traded good would be determined endogenously. However, both of our propositions will remain intact in this case. The driving force behind the result is the fact that, (w, r) continues to be determined by the competitive conditions in X and Y. Since the exact modelling and related algebraic calculations do not add much to our basic intuition, we do not include this in our current presentation. 4 The bottom line is that our propositions may not be sensitive to the nature of the goods produced in the informal segment.
Conclusions
We get back to the pair of questions addressed in this paper. Does liberal trade policy hurt informal workers? Does militant labour unionism help the non-unionized workers? Our answer to both these questions is 'no', if capital is allowed to move freely between sectors in response to sector specific policies. It is the rigidity in capital movements, possibly induced by institutional problems, which become quite crucial in determining the policy outcomes. Informal workers could possibly vote for reformatory polices and flexible labour laws provided there is some mechanism to ensure movement of capital between formal and informal sectors. 4 The structure has some relationship with flexible wage, full-employment models utilized in Marjit and Beladi (1996, 1999 
